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The purpose of this paper is to examine the strategic use of trade policy
when homogeneous products are competitively produced, but their marketing is
imperfectly competitive. This type of imperfect competition occurs in
agricultural markets when state trading agencies or marketing boards are the
sole marketing agents for products. It has also been hypothesized to occur in
private trade of some agricultural products, but the extent of the market power
of private traders is a highly controversial issue. Since the large U.S.S.R.
purchases of grain in the mid-1970's, the competitiveness of the U.S. grain
exporting industry has been highly disputed. Some have argued that high
concentration ratios for the largest exporting firms indicate market power
(Gilmore (1982)), while others argue that arbitrage opportunities and frequent
entry and exit of firms indicate a relatively competitive market (Caves (1978),
Caves and Pugel (1982), Thompson and Dahl (1979)).
The paper focuses on how the presence of state trading and the
competitiveness of private trade affect optimal government policy. By examining
a model in which a marketing board and private exporters are Cournot rivals in
the world market for a competitively produced good, we show that optimal policy
is sensitive both to the manner in which marketing boards operate and to the
degree of competition in private export trade. The empirical analysis
focuses on the importance of state trading in the world wheat market. Since the
United States is the major private trader of wheat, we examine the
competitiveness of the U. S. grain export sector.
There is a wealth of literature examining the implications of imperfect
competition in agricultural markets, but most of it focuses on countries as
units with market power and abstracts from issues relating to whether marketing
is done by state agencies or trading companies.1 The only study to examine
the impact of marketing institutions on optimal government policy is by Just,
Schmitz, and Zilberman (1979). They analyze a model in which a single marketing
agent price discriminates between domestic and foreign markets and the
government determines policy to maximize the sum of domestic consumer and
producer surplus. They show that as long as the government does not regulate
the domestic pricing of the agent and can subsidize domestic consumption and
production, free trade is the optimal trade policy. This result is the same
whether the marketing agent is a board which maximizes producer surplus or a
monopoly-monopsonist which maximizes profits. If, however, the government
forces a competitive price in the domestic market, it should tax exports of a
marketing board and subsidize exports if the agent is a monopoly-monopsonist.
The major shortcoming of the analysis is that it ignores the strategic
interaction of firms and governments when more than one country exports a
product.
The "new" literature on the strategic use of trade policy under imperfect
competition has, however, largely ignored the types of imperfect competition
that can occur in agricultural markets. Dixit (1984) and Eaton and Grossman
(1986) note imperfect competition in distribution as a reason for imperfectly
competitive trade, but recent models examining government policy have focused on
mlarkets with oligopolistic producers. This is not surprising since the insightsof these models have concerned the potential for a government to shift rents
toward its domestic market in industries with positive profits. Agriculture is
hardly a high profit sector!
However, if governments frequently intervene in agricultural markets, and
if one way they intervene is by creating state trading agencies, it is worth
examining how these institutions affect the strategic use of policy. Marketing
boards are common on both the export and import side of agricultural markets;
for example, several major exporters of dairy products and grain sell through
marketing boards, and major importers of grains, tobacco, and silk purchase
through such boards (Hoos (1979), Kostecki (1982)). For OECD trade in 34
agricultural products for 1976, Kostecki (1982, pp. 26, 286-8) estimates 28
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percent of exports and 27 percent of imports are accounted for by state trading.
It is also clear from the emphasis on agriculture in the current GATT
negotiations that government use of trade policy in these markets is not
trivial. Table 1 presents post-Tokyo Round trade weighted nominal tariff
protection for 22 traded good sectors for the EEC, Japan, and the United States.
Note that for the EEC and Japan, the agriculture, and food, beverage, and
tobacco sectors are among the top four ranked sectors. A ranking of export
subsidies by sector would be difficult (particularly given the prevalence of
indirect subsidies in both manufacturing and agriculture); however, the GATT
code regarding export subsidies is more lenient for primary products (other than
minerals) than for non-primary products, so that direct export subsidies are
more prevalent in agriculture.
The models we examine are based on rivalry of marketing agents and
governments of two countries exporting a homogeneous good, presumably
agricultural, to a third country. In part, the motivation for the models is the
widespread use of export subsidies in agriculture (World Bank (1986), Hillman
(1978)) and the recent result of Brander-Spencer (1985) that in the presence of
imperfect competition, export subsidies may be welfare improving for the country
imposing them. It is well understood that producers (in our case, farmers)
stand to gain if their governments increase their share of world markets,
ceteris paribus. The question of interest in light of the Brander-Spencer
analysis is whether export subsidies can be welfare improving given the type of
imperfect competition that occurs in agricultural markets.
The models in this paper are similar to the Brander-Spencer export rivalry
model (1985) in that marketing agents play a Nash quantity game given government
policies, but the governments can precommit to these policies so as to give
their agents a strategic advantage in world markets. There are, however,
several important differences between their model and ours: (i) production and
marketing in our model are carried out by different agents, and in one of our
countries, the marketing agent maximizes joint producer returns rather than
profits, (ii) there is domestic consumption in each exporting country, and
governments can subsidize or tax domestic production and consumption as well as
exports, and (iii) governments have the option of regulating prices charged to
domestic consumers. The first and third of these are important because they are
common characteristics of marketing boards and their regulation (Hoos (1979)),
and the second is particularly important for any model of agricultural trade.
For many products domestic consumption is a large portion of total sales, and
government intervention in domestic agricultural markets is quite common (Brown
(1986), Gardner (1986), Johnson (1973).
These features of our models are critical to the paper's contribution. A
major theoretical contribution of our analysis is to show that even when a good
is sold by two marketing agents, an export tax or free trade may be the optimal
government policy when the marketing agent maximizes producer returns and is
regulated in its domestic price policy. This differs from the Brander-Spencer
result that a subsidy is optimal when two profit maximizing firms sell a
homogeneous good in a third market. Our results differ from the existing ones
in the agricultural economics literature in that we show circumstances in which
a marketing board's government would optimally subsidize exports. The latter
results hinge on our introducing rivalry into the analysis.
The second contribution of the paper concerns the optimal policy of the
government in the country which privately markets the good. A quasi-competitive
model of private marketing is constructed to show that when a marketing board
and private trading industry with more than a few firms are rivals, it is
unlikely that the government of the private trading country should subsidize
exports.
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Finally, we present evidence on the structure of world trade in wheat to
indicate the relevance of the models presented.
1. Unregulated Marketing Board and Monopoly-Monopsony
Consider a world in which a homogeneous good is exported by two countries
to a third country which does not produce it. Each of the exporting countries
consumes the good, but because of restrictions outside the model, they do not
import it. One such restriction could be transport cost, which, for simplicity
is assumed to be zero here. The good is competitively produced, and producers
sell to a distributor or marketing agent rather than directly to consumers. In
practice this might occur because of technological features of transportation
and marketing services, but, again, we abstract from these here. The
competitive producer supply curve is upward sloping.
In each country there is a single marketing agent. In the home country it
is a private monopolist and in the foreign exporting country it is a statutory
marketing board. In both cases the agent handles all domestic, as well as
foreign sales, to consumers. The essential difference between them is their
objective functions. The home monopolist is assumed to maximize profits, while
the foreign marketing board maximizes the joint returns of its competitive
producers (farmers).3 Given its objective, the marketing board does not
exercise monopsony power, but in the absence of regulation, the monopolist does,
since its marginal cost (outlay) for the good is higher than the competitive
supply (producer) price.
Throughout the paper the assumptions about marketing agents comply with
stylized facts from the world wheat market, which is the focus of the empirical
analysis in Section 4. Empirical models of wheat trade often treat Canada and
the United States as duopolists since, together, they export roughly 60 percent
of world wheat exports. All Canadian sales of wheat are through the Canadian
Wheat Board, while the United States exports are through private firms. In this
section, we assume the private export industry is a domestic monopoly, but in
Section 3 we consider a quasi-competitive export industry since the
competitiveness of the United States grain export industry is disputed.
It should be noted that with only two marketing agents, there is no loss of
generality in restricting the analysis to a marketing board-private firm
rivalry. The policies which would be optimal for the government with a
marketing board in this game would carry over (qualitatively) to a game with two
marketing boards. The same is true for the government with a monopoly exporter.
As in Brander-Spencer (1985), the marketing agents are assumed to play a
Nash quantity game in which they take as given the subsidies and/or taxes levied
by their respective governments and the export sales of their rival. The
exporting country governments can precommit to their policies, so that they play
a Stackelberg game against the marketing agents and a Nash game against the
rival government. Unlike Brander-Spencer, the governments have three policy
instruments at their disposal: a consumption subsidy(tax), a production
subsidy(tax), and an export subsidy(tax). All subsidies or taxes are specific.
This allows us to compare optimal policies in this government game with those of
Just, et.al.(1979). Throughout the paper the analysis is partial equilibrium.
Marketing Agent Equilibrium
Let lower case variables refer to home country variables and upper case to
corresponding variables in the foreign exporting country. The home country
monopolist maximizes profits given by
(1) (1 - [d(y) + r]y + [Dm(x + X) + s]x - [p(y + x) - v](y + x)
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where y denotes domestic sales, x export sales, d(-) domestic inverse demand,
p(-) the competitive home inverse supply (producer price), Dm(-) inverse demand
for imports by the third country, and r,s, and v denote the home government
consumption subsidy(tax), export subsidy(tax), and production subsidy(tax),
respectively. A positive(negative) value for a policy denotes a subsidy(tax).
The marketing board maximizes the joint returns of competitive producers in its
country, given by
(2) II - [D(Y) + R]Y + [Dim(x + X) + S]X - fY+X[P q) - V]dq
For simplicity let inverse demand and supply curves be linear and given by
d(y) - a - by, D(Y) - A - BY, p(-) - f + k(y + x),
P(-) - F + K(Y + X), and D - a - b (x + X) where a, b, A, B, f, k, F, K, am,m m mm
and bm are positive. The linearity assumption is consistent with the bulk of
empirically estimated agricultural demand and supply equations. Other
functional forms would not alter the major points of the paper, although
magnitudes of effects and assumptions required for uniqueness and stability of
equilibria would differ.
First order conditions for the monopolist dictate that marginal revenue in
each market equal marginal cost, and are given by
(3) 8ir/y -a+r-2by-f+v-2k(x+y)-0
(4) air/8x - a + r - 2 bmx - b X - f + v - 2k(x + y) - 0.m m m
Second order conditions are given by -2(b + k) < 0, -2(bm + k) < 0, and
4(b + k)(bm + k) - 4k 2 > 0. First order conditions for the marketing board are
given by
(5) 8/8Y-A+R-2BY-F+V-K(X+Y)-0
(6) 8H/8X - a + S - 2bmX - bmx - F + V - K(X + Y) -O0,m m m
with second order conditions -(2B + K) < 0, -(2bm + K) < 0, and
(2B + K)(2bm + K) - K 2 > 0. As expected, the essential difference between the
monopolist and marketing board's first order conditions is that the monopolist's
marginal cost reflects its monopsony power while the board's marginal cost is
the competitive supply price.
For given values of r, v, s, R, V, and S, equations (3) - (6) determine
equilibrium consumption and exports of the two exporting countries. A
convenient way to describe the equilibrium is in terms of the two reaction
functions, 4(X) and cZ(x), which are derived by solving (3) and (5) for y and Y,
substituting into (4) and (6), and solving for x - 4(X) and X = @(x). The
reaction functions are
(7) 4(X) -b(a - f +s +v) +k(am - a+s -r) -b b(b +k)X
2[bm(b + k) + bk]
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(8) fi(x) -2B(am - F + S + V) + K(am - A + S -R) - bm(2B + K)x
2[bm (2B + K) + BK]
where 0'((x))c' < 1 is assumed to insure uniqueness and stability of the
equilibrium. Equilibrium values of exports are (x*, X*) such that 4(X*) -x*
and 4(x*) - X*, and y* and Y* are given by (3) and (5) evaluated at x* and X*.
Government Policy Choices
Following Just et.al., we measure each country's welfare by the sum of
domestic consumer and producer surplus and net government revenue. Home country
welfare is given by
w = J5[a - bq + r]dq - f +x[f + kq - v]dq
(9)
+ [am - bm(x + X) + s]x - ry - v(x + y) - sx.
Recalling that each government plays Stackelberg against marketing agents and
Nash against the rival government, the home government is assumed to choose r,
v, and s in order to maximize (9) given the behavior of agents and fixed foreign
policies. First order conditions for the home government are aw/ar = 0 for r =
r, v, and s where
aw/Or - [a - by*](8y*/8r)
(10) - [f + k(y* + x*)][(8y*/8r) + (8x*/8r)]
+ [am - 2b x* - b X*](8x*/8r) - b x*8X*/8r
m m m m
Using the monopolist's first order conditions, aw/Or can be written as
(11) 8w/Br - [k(y* + x*) - v][(8y*/8r) + (ax*/8r)] +
[by* - r][8y*/8r] - [s(8x*/8r) + bmx*(8X*/8r)]
Welfare is maximized for the following choices of r, v, and s
(12) r -by* > 0
(13) v =k(y* + x*) > 0
(14) s - -bmx*(8X*/8r)/(8x*/8r) > 0
where (8X*/8r)/(8x*/8r) - -bm(2B + K)/[2(bm(2B + K) + BK)] - Z4'(-) for any r =
r, v, and s.0
While these choices of r, v, and s are not unique, they are the only~
choices of the three consistent with offsetting each distortion in the model at
its source. Any other choices would necessitate targeting the export policy
partially toward either the domestic consumption or production distortion.5
Hence we follow Just et. al. in assuming that each policy is chosen to exactly
offset the distortion at its source. To see that this is possible, notice that
v, the production subsidy, enters both first order conditions for the home
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exporter. If v is chosen according to (13), the two first order conditions are
separated; and the consumption subsidy can be used to offset the domestic
consumption distortion, while the export subsidy can be used to exercise market
power abroad.
The foreign country's welfare, W, is given by an equation analogous to (9)
with the appropriate subsitution of upper case letters. That government chooses
R, V, and S to maximize welfare given the behavior of marketing agents and fixed
home country policies. Differentiating W with respect to r - R, S, and V and
substituting from the marketing board's first order conditions, the first order
conditions for the foreign exporting government can be written as
(15) 8W/ar = -V[(8Y*/Br) + (8X*/8t)] + [BY* - R](8Y*/8r)
- [S(8X*/8r) + b X*(8x*/8r)] - 0
Welfare is maximized for
(16) R =BY* > 0
(17) V -0
(18) S - -b X* (8x*/8r)/(8X*/8r) > 0
where (8x*/8r)/(8X*/8r) = -bm(b + k)/2[bm(b + k) + bk] = 4'(-) for r = R, V, and
S. We maintain the assumption that policies are determined to exactly offset
distortions at their source.
The Nash equilibrium for the government policy game is characterized by the
first order conditions for the monopolist and the marketing board, (3) - (6),
and equations (12) - (14) and (16) - (18). The governments' domestic policies
are similar to those of Just et.al., and the export subsidies are positive as in
the Brander-Spencer model without domestic consumption or a marketing board.
This is not surprising since we have targeted policies so that export policy
need not be adjusted to offset domestic distortions. Domestic policies are
determined completely by domestic distortions, so that the optimal policies are
no different in our model with export rivalry than in Just et.al.'s nonstrategic
environment. The government of the country with an unregulated monopoly-
monopsonist will subsidize domestic consumption and production, and the
government of the country with a marketing board need not subsidize production
but will subsidize consumption.
The difference in our export policy and Just et.al.'s comes from the export
rivalry. In Just et.al's analysis, a single marketing agent supplies the world
market. Given the ability to price discriminate, this marketing agent exports
the socially optimal quantity. With a Cournot export rivalry, however, each
agent's exports are a function of its rival's exports. A government with the
ability to precommit to an export subsidy can use that fact to improve its
country's welfare, ceteris paribus. Any marketing agent (marketing board or
monopolist) will export more with an export subsidy than it would otherwise.
This reduces the the exports of the foreign rival in equilibrium, hence
increasing domestic welfare via an increase in the marketing agent's profits.
This is a key feature missing in the Just et.al. analysis.
2. Regulated Marketing Board and Konopoly-Monopsony
The literature on strategic trade policy has focused on the impact of
governments being able to precommit to tax/subsidy policies. But governments
precommit to more than simple tax/subsidy policies. The market structures they
permit and their regulation of industry involve a precommitment! In the
previous section, we showed that a government precommiting to a statutory
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marketing board (in order to eliminate potential exercise of monopsony power
against producers) did not affect the policy prescriptions for strategic use of
trade policy. In this section, we show that this result is altered when the
government with a marketing board regulates the domestic pricing of the board.
There are two reasons for doing this. One is to show that regulating the board
in the hope of eliminating the need for a consumption subsidy is not as
innocuous as it might seem. The second reason is that it is not uncommon for
governments to impose such rules on their marketing boards (Hoos (1979)).
Consider a game identical to the one in the previous section, with the
exception that the marketing board maximizes joint returns of its competitive
producers subject to the constraint that domestic inverse demand equals inverse
supply [i.e. D(Y) + R = P(Y + X) - V]. The regulated marketing board's first
order conditions are
(19) A+R - BY - F+V - K(Y+X) -0
(20) a +S - 2b X - bmx - F+V - K(X+Y) +KBY/(B+K) -Om m m
where use has been made of the constraint in obtaining equation (20). Notice
the regulation prevents the marketing board from equating marginal revenue in
each market with marginal cost. Moreover, the last term in (20) implies the
board will export more than it would in the absence of regulation.
The regulated board's reaction function is derived by solving (19) for Y,
substituting into (20), and solving for X - (x) given by
(21) T(x) - ( + y - ax)/o
where 9- B(B+2K)(am +S - F+V),
2
y-K(a +S -A -R),m
2
A - b (B + K) , and
m
2
a-2bm(B + K) + BK(B + 2K).m
For given values of r, v, s, R, V, and S, equations (3), (4), (19), and
(20) determine equilibrium consumption and exports of the two exporting
countries when the marketing board is regulated. Equilibrium exports in this
# ## #
game are given by (x , X ) such that 4(X ) - x and
nuyr# (##
W(x ) - X , arid equilibrium values of y and Y are given by (3) and (19)
evaluated at x" and X . 4'(1(X))1' < 1 is assumed to insure uniqueness and
stability of the equilibrium.
To determine optimal policies for the foreign exporting government, we
differentiate W with respect to r - R, V, and S and substitute the modified
first order conditions, (19) and (20) to obtain
(22) 8W/8r = -V[(8Y /8r) + (8X /8r)] - R(8Y /ar)
- [S + KBY /(B + K)](8X /87) - bX X(ax /ar)
Welfare maximizing policy choices are
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(23) R - V = 0, and
(24) S - -KBY#/(B + K) - bX (8x /8r)/(8X#/8r)
where (8x /8r)/(8X /8r) - 4'(-) is independent of the policy tool.
The equilibrium for this policy game is characterized by the first order
conditions for the monopolist and the regulated marketing board, (3), (4), (19),
and (20), and equations (23), (24), (12) - (14) evaluated at x#, y#, and X#.
Qualitatively, the home government policies are not affected by whether or not
the board is regulated. However, the optimal trade policy of the foreign
exporting government becomes ambiguous when it substitutes domestic price
regulation for a consumption subsidy. The optimal policy is a tax if the first
term in S dominates, and a subsidy if the second term dominates. The reason
that a tax might be appropriate is most easily seen in Just et. al.'s
nonstrategic case. In their model a regulated marketing board would export too
much from society's point of view unless it were taxed. This occurs because at
the socially optimal level of exports the board could purchase an extra unit of
the good at the competitive supply price, increase its domestic price by the
increase in the supply price, and sell the extra unit plus the reduction in
domestic consumption abroad. The first term in (24) reflects the fact that for
a given level of home exports, the regulated board will export too much, while
the second term reflects the effect of the board's exports on home country
exports in equilibrium.
3. Quasi-Competitive Home Market
It is well known that optimal policy in oligopolistic trade models is
sensitive to the number of firms (Dixit (1984), Salant (1984), Krugman (1987),
Cooper and Riezman (1986)), and it is natural to expect the same to be true
here. The statutory marketing board is a clear barrier to entry in the foreign
exporting country, but unless barriers to entry are prohibitive in the home
country we might expect more than one marketing agent even if there are
economies of scale in distribution. For that reason we examine a quasi-
competitive model for the home country.
This exercise is motivated largely because the competitiveness of the U.S.
agricultural marketing system has been a controversial issue. In the mid 70's
some sources claimed that the market was essentially monopolistic/monopsonistic,
and in response, several government, academic, and private studies have examined
the issue empirically. As will be seen in Section 4, even if the U.S.
agricultural marketing system is not purely competitive, it is clearly not a
pure monopoly-monopsony. For that reason, it is important to know how sensitive
the policy choices are to the number of firms in the home country.
The simplest way to do this would be to increase the number of firms in the
previous two games. A more general model and one consistent (in a stylized
fashion) with the example of U.S. wheat trade presented in Section 4 is one
which allows two types of home firms: one which exports and one which only
markets domestically because of a cost disadvantage. In the limit the model
allows the possibility of imperfect competition in the export sector, but the
inability of exporting firms to exercise monopsony power in the domestic market
because of competition with firms marketing the good domestically. In~ this
section we examine optimal policy when the home market is modified to allow for
this possibility.
Suppose export marketing involves a distribution cost in addition to the
producer price of the good. We abstract from whether this is a transport or
information-related cost, and for simplicity we assume it is constant per unit
sold. There are n + h firms, the last h of which have a cost disadvantage
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relative the the first n firms. Distribution cost, per se, in the domestic
market remains zero. Profit for the ith firm is given by
(25) i. - [a + r - b(y. + y.)]y. + [a + s - b(x. + x. + X)]x.1 1 1 1 m 1 1 1
- [f - v + k(x. + x. + y. + y.)](y. + x.) - c.x.
1 1 1 1 1 1. 1 1
where yi = 5 y, and N - xj and ci is per unit export distribution cost.
Firms are differentiated only by this cost parameter, which for simplicity we
assume to be low, c1 , or high, c 2 . For i - 1,...,n, c1 - c 1 , yi= y1 and x = x 1 ,
and for i - n + 1,...,n + h, c. -c2' iy2 and x = x2'
For high enough values of c2 , x 2 = 0, and the relevant first order
conditions are
(26) ax 1/ay 1 -a + r - (n + 1)by1 - hby2 - f + v - k(n + 1)(y 1 + x)
- hky 2 - 0,
(27) 8ir 2 /y 2 - a + r - (h + 1)by 2 - nby 1 - f + v - k(h + 1)y 2
- nk(y 1 + x 1 ) = 0, and
(28) irs/8x1 =am + s - (n + 1)bmxl - bmX - f + v - k(n + 1)(x 1 + y1 )
-hky 2 - c 1 - 0.
The reaction function for a home exporter in this model is derived by solving
(26) and (27) for y1 , substituting into (28), and solving for x - 41 (X). Since
exporting firms are symmetric, the reaction function for the home country export
sector is nd1 (X) where
(29) 01(X) = (a + # - yX)/6
where a = b(am - f + s + v - c1),
= k(am - a + s - r - c1),
y - bm(b + k), and
6 - (n + l)[bm(b + k) + bk]/n.
Notice that 41(X) differs from 4(X) only by the subtraction of cyjb + k) in the
numerator and replacement of the number 2 in the denominator by (n + 1)/n.
Domestic consumption in the home country is ny 1 + hy 2 where
(30) y1 = y2 - kx1 /(b + k).
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As we might expect, each exporter sells less at home than a typical domestic
marketing firm.
As before, the marketing board's reaction function will depend on whether
or not it is regulated. Denoting the marketing board's cost to distributing
exports by C, its reaction function if it is unregulated is given by subtracting
C(2B + K) from the numerator of the expression for '(x) in equation (8). If the
board is regulated, its reaction function is given by subtracting C[B(B + 2K) +
2
K ] from the numerator of the expression for '(x) in equation (21). Notice that
because of the way C enters, it does not affect the slope of either marketing
board's reaction function.
As before, optimal policies for each government are derived by
differentiating the expressions for welfare with respect to policies and
substituting from the relevant first order conditions. The expressions for
welfare differ from those in Section 3 by the subtraction of the distribution
cost multiplied by exports. The equilibrium for a game between the home
government and the unregulated board is now characterized by (29) and the
reaction function for the unregulated marketing board incorporating C and the
following policies:
**
(31) r - by*,
** **
(32) v - k(y 1  + x* ),
**
(33) s - -bx 1 (n[1 + V'(-)) - 1),
**
(34) R - BY*,
(35) V - 0, and
(36) S - -b X*n '(-)
m
where superscript ** denotes equilibrium values for this game.
Table 2 presents these policies and the policies from the previous games.
Notice that qualitatively the foreign exporting government's policies are
unaffected by the modification of home market structure. Subsidizing both
domestic consumption and exports remains optimal. The home government continues
to subsidize both domestic consumption and production, but the optimal export
policy is now ambiguous. It is a subsidy, free trade, or a tax as n is less
than, equal to, or greater than 1/(1 + c'(-)). Since V'(-) is independent of
any choice variable this result is independent of the foreign government subsidy
or tax policy. In fact, since '(-) e (-.5, 0), the existence of two home
exporting firms is sufficient for a tax to be optimal.
Now consider the game with n > 1 home firms and a regulated marketing
board. The policy equilibrium is described by (29) and the regulated marketing
board reaction function incorporating C and the following policies:
(37) r -by 1
(38) v - k(y 1 + x1 ),
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(39) s = -b xl(n[l + V'(.)] - 1),ml1
(40) R = V = 0, and
(41) S = -b X n6'(-) - KBY /(B + K)
m 1
where superscript ## denotes equilibrium values for this game.
Again two exporting firms are enough for an optimal export tax at home.
And as before, the invariance of the slope of the board's reaction function with
respect to choice variables makes this result independent of foreign policy. As
shown in Table 2, optimal foreign policies are qualitatively the same as those
for the regulated board with a home country monopoly-monopsony. Essentially the
regulation of domestic price gives the board extra incentive to export, so that
the optimal export policy is either a lower subsidy than in the unregulated case
or a tax.
4. World Wheat Trade, State Trading, and Market Structure
Each of the four models examined is characterized by the rivalry of two
exporting countries with market power in international trade, where one of the
countries exercises its power, in part, through a marketing board. Hence these
models would apply to markets dominated by a few countries, at least one of
which sells through a marketing board. One such market is the world wheat
market. The combined exports of the two largest exporting countries, Canada and
the United States, comprise roughly 60 percent of world exports. The combined
market share of the top four exporters is approximately 80 percent. 6
Table 3 gives an indication of the portion of world wheat exports which was
either sold or purchased by marketing or state trading agencies for selected
periods between 1963 and 1984.7 The table includes exports of the United
States, Canada, EEC, Australia, Argentina, and U.S.S.R.. Exports of the United
States and EEC are private, and after 1963-67 Argentina's exports are private.
Canada and Australia sell through marketing boards. The EEC is the only major
importer which is private since the Western European countries other than the
EEC have state trading agencies for wheat, and the Japanese import through the
Japanese Food Agency. Although their market shares are variable, the U.S.S.R.
and Peoples Republic of China are large importers.
Note that less than six percent of the exports in Table 3 is sold by
private traders to private traders. This trade is primarily United States
exports to the EEC, and has been declining over time. Percentages in the second
row indicate that over half of the exports are sold by private traders to state
importers. These percentages reflect mainly United States and EEC exports.
Rows three and four indicate the exports of state exporters by their
destination. Note that the sum of these (given in row six) is roughly a third
of total exports. Finally, the sum of imports by state traders ranges between
86 and 96 percent.
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Imperfectly Competitive Models of World Wheat Trade
Market shares for the major wheat exporters have remained fairly stable
over the past twenty years, with the exception that the EEC share of world
exports has roughly doubled in the last decade. Because of the large and stable
export shares, a number of studies have examined oligopolistic models of the
world wheat market (McCalla (1966), Taplin (1969), Alaouze, Watson, and Sturgess
(1978), Schmitz, McCalla, Mitchell, and Carter (1981), Karp and McCalla (1983),
Paarlberg and Abbott (1984), and Kolstad and Burris (1986)). These studies
have made a variety of assumptions about numbers of rivals and the nature of
competition among them.
Perhaps the closest to the models developed here is that of Kolstad and
Burris (1986) which is a spatial equilibrium trade model in which producing
country governments are Nash quantity competitors who maximize profits and have
the ability to price discriminate between domestic and foreign sales. For 1972-
73 trade flows, they examine hypotheses of (i) a U.S.-Canada duopoly, (ii) a
U.S.-Canada-Australia triopoly, (iii) a Japan-EEC duopsony, and (iv) perfect
competition. They find that the U.S.-Canadian duopoly comes the closest to
predicting actual trade for that year.8
These results suggest a game between the U.S. and Canadian governments with
sales agents being the Canadian Wheat Board and U.S. grain exporters is a useful
abstraction. One of the major goals of the Canadian Wheat Board is to maximize
producer returns, and it is the sole agent for both domestic and foreign sales
of Canadian wheat. Since September, 1973, the price it can charge domestically
has been regulated (Schmitz and McCalla (1979)), so that its behavior comes
closest to the regulated board in our models. The remaining issue as to which
of the models would apply to a Canadian-U.S. duopoly concerns the
competitiveness of the U.S. marketing system.
Competitiveness of U.S. Grain Marketing
A 1976 report of USDA's Farmer Cooperative Service claimed that the largest
six grain exporting firms accounted for 90 percent of U.S. exports of grain
(USGAO, 1982). Estimates of concentration in U.S. grain exporting plus the
controversial sales of grain to the U.S.S.R. in the mid-70s stimulated a series
of studies of the competitiveness of this sector.
Several of these were done by the General Accounting Office of the U.S.
government. They focused on providing revised estimates of concentration in the
export sector (USGAO (1982), Conklin (1982)) and on the efficiency of futures
markets for grains (Conklin (1982)). Table 4 presents GAO's estimates of
concentration ratios for wheat, corn, soybeans, and all grains. Since many of
the same firms that export wheat also trade other grains, we present evidence
for other grains, as well. Three characteristics are evident. First, the
export sector is not as concentrated as the 1976 estimate suggests. The largest
four exporters account for 61 percent of export sales for wheat, and one must
include the largest twenty firms to account for 90 percent of export sales.
Second, the concentration ratios for corn, soybeans, and all grains are lower
than for wheat. Finally, concentration ratios for domestic sales are lower
still. Caves and Pugel (1982) present similar evidence based on a survey of
members of the North American Export Grain Association. Their evidence points
to the largest firms handling a majority of "direct" export sales, while many
smaller firms purchase grain from farmers to sell domestically or to the largest
exporters who then export it (the latter type of sale being classified as
" indirec t" exports) .
High concentration ratios are not necessarily indicative of the exercise of
market power. In the short run, firms in a highly concentrated industry have
the potential to exercise market power until entry can occur. While the grain
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export industry is highly concentrated, there has been considerable entry and
exit in the industry over the last decade. The number of firms reporting export
sales of wheat increased forty percent between marketing year 1974/75 and
1983/84, and the number of firms exporting corn and soybeans increased thirty
9
percent over the same period. As reported in Caves and Pugel (1982), one of
the largest firms exited the industry during that period (Cook).
Evidence of price discrimination by exporting firms in the absence of
government subsidies would be indicative of market power. Except in the
limiting case (n = h - c) of the quasi-competitive model, the analysis in this
paper assumes firms have the ability to price discriminate between the home and
foreign market. Although the difference between the export and domestic
consumer price in any of the models may be positive or negative, all of the
models predict a positive correlation between this difference and export volume
for zero or constant distribution cost per unit. With perfect competition and
constant distribution cost, export volume and this price difference are
unrelated. It is, therefore, possible to test for market power and the ability
to price discriminate by testing for a positive relation between export volume
and the difference between export and domestic prices.
To prove ability to price discriminate, data for export and wholesale
prices for the same type and grade of exports, net of distribution costs are
necessary. We have export and wholesale prices for the same grade of wheat for
hard red winter (hrw) and dark northern spring (dns) wheat for 1962/63 -
1983/84. Export and wholesale price data for the same period are also available
for corn and soybeans.10 Unfortunately data for distribution cost are not
available, so that any analysis of the relation between the export-wholesale
price differential and export volume must be interpreted in light of potential
effects this cost might have. For example, it would be possible in the
framework of the models presented here for the export-domestic consumer price
difference to be negatively correlated if there were significant economies of
scale in distribution. Caves and Pugel (1982) present evidence of such
economies of scale in distribution as part of their explanation for the high
concentration of the U.S. grain export industry.
Table 5 presents the results of eight regressions of the export-wholesale
price differential on export volume. The first four columns describe the
results for the period 1962/63 - 1983/84. Column labels denote the commodity
for which the price differential is the dependent variable. All data are yearly
and prices are in real terms. Because the price differential could be affected
by shifts in underlying consumer demand and producer supply or changes in
distribution cost, we include time as a regressor to capture any systemmatic
changes in these excluded variables. Since the relation between the price
differential and export volume can be affected by economies of scale in
distribution and export volume has grown over time, we also include time
multiplied by export volume. Finally, for the years 1962/63 -1972/73, the
United States subsidized wheat exports, so that we include a dummy equal to one
in-the subsidy years and zero in non-subsidy years. Neither corn nor soybeans
were subsidized; however, corn exports showed a dramatic shift in 1972/3, so
that a dummy equal to one is included for that and subsequent years.
With the exception of wheat, the explanatory power of these regressions is
low. Moreover, the wheat regressions are consistent with the export subsidy
being the major determinant of any price differential. The wheat subsidy dummy
is the only variable significant at the five percent level in any of the
regressions. Export volume and trend*volume are significant at the ten percent
level only in the case of dns wheat.
The last four columns in Table 5 refer to results of a slightly different
regression for the period 1974/5 - 1983/84. For each of the years in the
period, data are available for the number of firms reporting export sales. For
the same reasons that concentration ratios are a poor measure of market power,
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the number of firms need not be indicative of either the presence or absence of
market power. Nonetheless, there was substantial entry during this period, so
that we include the number of firms as a regressor. If the industry were purely
competitive there should be no relation between the price differential and the
number of firms. The dummy variables are not applicable to this period. 11
Notice first the marked difference between the explanatory power of the
wheat regressions and those for the other grains. While the coefficient of
export volume is positive in all cases, it is significant at the five percent
level only for wheat (the significance level for corn is 21 percent). Recalling
that the four-firm concentration ratio for wheat is noticeably higher than that
for the other two, these results are at least suggestive of the exercise of
market power in wheat. In none of the regressions, however, is the coefficient
for the number of firms significant.
For both types of wheat, volume, trend, and trend*volume are significant at
the five percent level. Note that because we include trend*volume, the partial
effects of volume and trend are functions of both their coefficients and the
coefficient of trend*volume. Thus for the wheat regressions, we report the
partial effects of volume and time for each year in Table 6. As expected, in
the regressions for 1962/63 - 1983/84 the partial effects are rarely
significant. For 1974/5-1983/4, however, the partial effects of volume and
trend are often significant. For both types of wheat, the partial effect of
volume on the price differential is positive until the late 70's and becomes
negative in the 80's. The partial effect of trend on the differential goes from
positive to negative in the case of hrw wheat, while it is consistently negative
for dns wheat.
There are a number of interpretations we could give to the volume and trend
results for 1974/75-1983/84. One interpretation is that exporting firms have
market power and that the trend term reflects economies of scale in
distribution. If economies of scale became more important toward the end of the
period, the partial effect of volume would become negative over time. Another
interpretation is that the industry is relatively competitive, with entry
occurring over the period in response to short run profits of the mid-seventies.
The latter interpretation is consistent with evidence of Caves (1978), who found
a significant relation between profit margins and volume of sales for all grains
for the year 1973/74. For a more extended period, he found a significant
relation only for soybeans.
In summary, the evidence presented here is consistent with that of others
(Caves (1978), Caves and Pugel (1982), Conklin (1982), and USGAO (1982)). Grain
exporting is highly concentrated because of economies of scale in distribution,
but barriers to entry in U.S. grain marketing are not prohibitive. Large
exporting firms may be in a position to exercise market power in the short run,
and they may have done so in the mid-70's. Nonetheless, the industry cannot be
characterized as a pure monopoly-monopsony.
This result is important in light of our results in Section 3. The optimal
trade policy for the home government changes from an export subsidy with
monopoly-monopsony to an export tax with two exporting firms. Whether or not
U.S. exporting firms have market power, it appears that the appropriate
government policy to maximize social welfare would be an export tax.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we examined several theoretical models capable of showing how
state trading and competition in private export trade affect strategic use of
trade policy. Recent literature in this area has focused on oligopolistic
industries in which private firms maximize profits and are unregulated. In our
analysis, if domestic tax/subsidy policy can be used in conjunction with trade
policy, optimal trade policy is qualitatively the same whether an export agent
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maximizes producer returns or profits. If, however, governments regulate
domestic consumer prices, appropriate trade policy may be quite different
depending on the marketing agent's objective.12 We find that the exports of a
regulated marketing board might be optimally taxed by its government, whereas a
government would optimally subsidize exports of a monopolist exporter.
We also find that when a marketing board and a private export industry
composed of one or more firms compete as Cournot rivals, the government of the
country with the private industry would subsidize exports only when marketing is
done by a monopolist. In light of this result, our empirical analysis of the
United States grain industry suggests export subsidies would not be welfare
improving from a national point of view. Based on the ability of exporters to
price discriminate between domestic and export sales, we find no evidence of the
exercise of market power in corn and soybean markets. For the period 1974/75-
1983/84, we find limited support for price discrimination in wheat markets.
Nonetheless, during this period at least 41 firms recorded export sales of
wheat, so that the policy prescription of the theoretical model for this case
would be an export tax.
Several issues not addressed here are potentially interesting. First, the
importing country in these models also has market power. Brander and Spencer
(1984, 1985) have examined optimal policy of an importing country in the face of
imperfect competition. Our evidence for wheat trade suggests two ways optimal
import policy might be approached. Since over 80 percent of wheat imports is
purchased by state traders (recall Table 3), it would be interesting to examine
how the objective of the state importing agency affects policies and market
outcomes. The other interesting approach would be to allow the importer to
produce (and perhaps export) the good. The motivation for this complication
comes from the prominent role of the EEC in agricultural markets and trade
negotiations. Carter and Schmitz (1979) have examined the EEC's variable levy
as an optimal tariff, but it is clear that EEC intervention in agricultural
markets comes from more than a simple optimum tariff calculation (Brown (1986),
Gardner (1986), Hayes and Schmitz (1986), and Sarris (1986)).
Finally, in our models the marketing board maximized joint producer returns
and its government maximized social welfare. In practice, marketing boards and
governments also have price stability goals. Since it is well known that policy
implications in strategic models are sensitive to whether rivals compete in
output or price (Eaton and Grossman (1986)), we expect policies would differ if
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1 McCalla and Schmitz (1982) and studies in McCalla and Josling (1981) argue
that market outcomes will vary depending on the source of the imperfect
competition.
2 Export subsidies for primary products are to be avoided when they lead to a
more than "equitable" share of the market, whereas countries are not to grant
subsidies (either direct or indirect) which lead to export prices below domestic
prices in the case of non-primary products.
3 See Markusen (1984) for an analysis of marketing boards which maximize
profits.
4 As shown by Dixit (1984), this choice is equivalent to the government
choosing domestic and export sales to maximize welfare. To see this, substitute
r, v, and s given by (12)-(14) into (3) and (4). The monopolist's first order
conditions are then equivalent to those which would emerge if the government
were to choose x and y to maximize (9)
8w/By - a - by - f - k(y + x) - 0
8w/ax - a - 2b x - b [Z(x) + x '(x)] -f - k(y + x) = 0.m m m
5 It is, of course, also possible to employ only a production and consumption
subsidy/tax, but exposition would be more difficult.
6 These percentages were calculated from data in International Wheat Council,
International Wheat Statistics, and may be off by +/- 2 or 3 percent in any
year. Nevertheless, the market shares have been relatively stable over the past
twenty years.
7 See McCalla and Schmitz (1982), Appendix 3, pp. 291-293, for a list of state
trading boards and agencies.
8 Essentially there are more nonzero bilateral trade flows for wheat than a
perfectly competitive spatial equilibrium model would predict. An alternative
approach to predicting these flows would be to treat wheat as a differentiated
product (Johnson, Grennes, and Thursby (1979)).
9 Information was provided by the Export Sales Reporting Division of the
Foreign Agricultural Service. In marketing year 1974/75 there were 41 firms
reporting exports of wheat, 56 firms reporting corn exports, and 39, soybean
exports. In 1983/84 there were 61 firms reporting exports of wheat, 76 firms
reporting corn exports, and 53, reporting soybean exports.
10 Data for wheat are available by protein content, while price data are
available only for #2 yellow corn and #1 yellow soybeans. The difference lies
in the fact that, strictly speaking, wheat is not homogeneous and is demanded
for different end uses, while corn and soybeans are not. See Johnson, et. al.
(1979) on this point.
11 It can be argued that credit policies are effective subsidies, but neither
our models nor our empirical work incorporate these.
12 If the private monopolist, for example, were regulated in the same manner,
a higher export subsidy than otherwise would be optimal.
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Lower case letters denote home government policies and upper case, foreign.
r >0 (<0) denotes specific consumption subsidy (tax).
v >0 (<0) denotes specific production subsidy (tax).
s >0 (<0) denotes specific export subsidy (tax).
AVERAGE 6.09 8.28 3.59
SOURCE: Based on information in tables 5.7 - 5.9
of Deardorff, A.V. and R.M. Stern, The Michioan
Model of World Eroduction and Trade. Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1986
Table 3
State Trading in Wheat - percentage of volume of
principal exporters accounted for by state traders
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Source: Conklin, N.C., An Economic Analysis of the Pricing
Efficiency and Marketing Organization of the U.S.
Grain Export System. U.S. General Accounting Office,
Staff Study GAO/CED 82-61S; June 15, 1982, pp. 30,
31, 33.
SOURCE: For 1963-1977 data from Table 3.5 of "State Trading in Grain",
McCalla, A. and Schmitz. StateTrading in International Markets
edited by M.M. Kostecki. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.
For 1980-84 percentages calculated from International Wheat Council.
World Wheat Statistics. various issues.
0
Table 5
U.S. Export-Wholesale Price Differential
1962/3-1983/4 1974/5-1983/4
Yariabkles Wh-a;(hrlMI Wh(a(dns) Corn S oybeans~ Wheathrw1 WheatIL(dns) CQr.n Sybeans
Constant -0.201 -0.309 -. 167 .338 -0.924** -0.577** -1.284 1.44
(-.60) (-.944) (-.65) (.46) (-6.55) (-3.47) (-1.67) (.34)
Volume 0.025 0.058* .0004 .0002 0.093** 0.053** .0004 .001
(.76) (1.81) (1.01) (.08) (5.41) (2.61) (1.44) (.30)
Trend 0.014 0.033 .013 -. 045 0.153** 0.082** .129 .247
(.70) (1.66) (.55) (-.61) (6.55) (2.99) (1.35) (.72)
Trend*Volume -0.001 -0.003' -. 000 .000 -0.013** -0.009** -. 000 -. 0002
(-.56) (-1.83) (-.58) (.27) (-7.05) (-4.39) (-1.87) (-.24)
Number Firms N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.000 0.008 .018 -. 065
(-.03) (1.88) (1.92) (-1.17)
Dummy -0.678**a -0.846**a -. 383 *b N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
(-6.16) (-7.85) (-1.79)
R2  0.938 0.958 .175 .03 .925 .915 .647 .439
*Significant at 10% level
**Significant at 5% level
aDummy for export subsidy through 1972.
bDummy for demand shift in 1973.
For wheat, export volume and export prices are taken from
International Wheat Council, International heat Statistics, various
issues. Export price for hard red winter is for #2, 13% protein, fob
Gulf. Export price for dark northern spring is the average of fob Gulf
and Pacific prices for 14% protein. Wholesale prices for wheat are
"prices to millers" for the same types of wheat and protein content, and
were taken from Economic Research Serv-ice, USDA, Wheat Situation and
Wheat Situation and Outlook, various issues. The wholesale price for
hard red winter is the Kansas price, and the wholesale price for dark
northern spring is the Minnesota price.
Export prices and volume and wholesale prices for corn and soybeans
are from Economic Research Service, USDA, Agricultural Ouctock, October
1986. Export prices are fob Gulf, and wholesale prices are Chicago
prices for *2 yellow corn and *l yellow soybeans.
All prices are deflated by the consumer price index taken from
Azricultural Outlook.
Table 6. Partial Effects of Export Volume and Trend
of U.S. Export - Wholesale Price Differential
Year t-Slat. Tie_
"" V a V "
Wheat (b= )
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
72.
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
0.024
0.023
0.022
0.022.
0.02
0.02.9
0.02.8
0.02.7
0.02.6
0.02.49
0.02.39
0.02.29
0.01129
0.02.09
0. 0099
0.0089
0. 0079
0.0069
0. 0059
0. 0049
0.0039
0.0028
0.772.
0.778
0.7851
0. 7922.
0. 7989
0.8051
0.82.03
0. 8139
0.82.49
0.82.22
0. 8042
0. 7892.
0.7648
0.7294
0.6817
0. 622.6
0 .552.2
0.4732
0.3922.
0.32.26
0 .2349
0.1.639
0. 0079
0. 005 8
0.007
0.0056
0. 0069
0.0067
0.0089
0. 0082
0.007
0.008
0.0025
0.0028
0.0038
0.0026
0.0045
0.0026
0.0023
0.0008
-0.002.3
-0.004
-0.0003
0.0002.
0. 692.8
0.5961
0. 6657
0.5882
0. 6602.
0.652.8
0. 7088
0. 6986
0.6625
0. 6954
0. 2557
0. 2963
0.4153
0.275
0.4918
0.2776
0.2358
0.0696
-0.0969
-0.234
.0.022.3
0.0099
2..1274
0.62.47
0. 9565
0.58.1
0.9248
0. 8792
1.281
2.182.8
0.9384
1.1552.
-0.4936
-0. 3849
-0.0374
-0.4423
0.22.43
.0.4356
-0.5454
-0.9411
-1.2772
-1.5085
.1232
-1.0685
W~heat (hr'A
0.0802.,*
0. 0674**
0. 0547**
0.042.
0.0294
0.02.67
0.0041
-0. 0086.E
-0. 021.3,
-0.0339
5.088
4. 6792
4.1521
3.4755
2. 6225
1. 5862
0 .4006
"0. 8507
"2.0552.
"3.12.72
0.0208
0.0058
0.0298
0.006
0.0016 
-0. 0l76**
-0. 0432 *
-0.077 .
-0. 0304,
-0. 0257
3.0017
0. 9632
3.8598
1.0057
0.2718
-2. 9772.
-56039
-6.702
-4.5808
-4.07
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
72.
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
0.055*
0.052.8*
0.0486*
0. 0454
0. 0422
0.039
0. 0358
0.0326
0. 0294
0.0262
0.023
0.0198
0.0166
0. 0134
0. 0102
0.007
0. 0038
0. 0006
-0. 0026
-0. 0058
-0.0091
-0.0123
Wheat (dr s)
1.8015 0.02.26
1.787 0.0058
1.7694 0.0099
1.7477 0.0055
1.722. 0.0095
1.6879 0.0089
1.6467 0.0157
1.5954 0.02.36
1.5314 0.0097
1.4517 0.0131
1.3529 -0.0047
1.2315 -0.0036
1.0849 -0.0003
0.92.18 -0.0041
0.72.39 0.0019
0.4964 -0.0041
0.268 -0.0052
0.039 -0.01
-0.1805 -0.0165
-0.3828 -0.0251
-0.5634 -0.0133
-0.721 -0.0121
Wheat (dns)
0.0434*
0. 0342
0. 0249
0.02.56
0. 0063
-0.003
-0.02.22
-0.0215k
-0.0308**
-0. 0401
2.3449
2. 0145
1. 6033
1.0949
0.4792.
-0.2379
-1.0217
-1.8094
-2.5288
-3. 1279
.0. 0146.*
-0.0256
-0.008 *
-0. 0254*,*
-0. 0287**
-0. 0428,
-0. 0615.
-0.0862
-0. 0521
-0.0487
-1.7938
-3.6339
-0. 8848
-3.5995
-4.2.72.3
-6.2.301
-6.7732
-6.3774
-6. 6736
-6.5413
